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THE SITUATION « ON THE GROUND » AND HOW IT CAME ABOUT — POST-IMJIN TO MANCHU BLITZKRIEG

« In the years following the Imjin War, court officials began to improve the economy and build up defenses.30 This included passing early taxation and revenue reforms. Thousands of Koreans had died in the war, and their loss resulted in a severely damaged agricultural system—the base of government taxation and of the livelihood of the people. Routine farming had ceased for six to eight years, devastating food production. It was imperative to maintain rice paddies, as rice farming is an intricate process requiring constant work to maintain the artificial irrigation system. […]

However, domestic and international issues interfered with the rebuilding process. First, political questions arose surrounding King Kwanghaegun’s legitimacy—complicated by his proximity to the Jurchen (aka the Manchu)—that led to clashes with the scholar-official bureaucracy and a coup that culminated in his nephew, King Injo, obtaining the throne in 1623. […]

During the Imjin War, amidst concerns that the king could die without a legitimate heir, King Sŏnjo appointed Kwanghaegun as crown prince, angering one of the political factions, the Westerners (Sŏin), who advocated waiting. An opposing faction, the Great Northerners (Taebugin), supported the decision. King Sŏnjo eventually had two sons by different wives in 1601, but neither was immediately declared crown prince. However, as the children grew, more people began whispering that Kwanghaegun was illegitimate and that King Sŏnjo’s other two sons were the rightful heirs, rumors that threatened Kwanghaegun’s kingship. King Kwanghaegun’s two half-brothers were assassinated, most likely by Kwanghaegun’s supporters, which plunged Kwanghaegun into deep trouble. It was in this fraught political context that the Manchu arrived on the scene. […]

The Manchu were nomadic tribes whose lives were supported by hunting, trapping, and fishing. Some came from a forest environment, others from the plains. In addition to the Manchu, other Jurchen tribes and some Mongols lived in the region north of the Chosŏn frontier. Originally of Jurchen origin, one tribe coalesced around charismatic and militarily powerful leaders, grew into a major federation, and gained the notice of the Ming. By the 1590s, Nurhachi, their leader, emerged as a rising military power and, inspired to revive the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1115–1234) heritage, sought to conquer China for its wealth and resources. Exploiting a weakened Ming, Nurhachi expanded his power into Manchuria in the late 1610s. Based on geographic proximity, Korea was an early concern for the Manchu. As their main objective was China, they had to ensure Korea did not become a hindrance. In 1616, the Ming acted against the Manchu and began preparing for a counterattack, requisitioning thirteen thousand troops from Korea […]

The failed Ming campaign had the added effect of defeating Chinese power in Manchuria. After this loss, the Ming could no longer support Korea, a fact Nurhachi keenly understood. In 1621, all the other towns in Manchuria were captured from the Ming, making the situation even more politically tenuous in Korea. Political factions within the Chosŏn court used the threat of an invasion to gain power and vilify competing parties. The Westerners abhorred the thought of peace with the Manchu, considering them barbarians, while the Southerners urged negotiation. […]

With the Westerners in power, government policy shifted to a pro- Ming stance. King Injo was a weak king dominated by the bureaucratic officials who had enthroned him—a group of politicians belligerent toward the Manchu and supportive of the Ming. They granted Chinese generals access to Chosŏn territory, which the Chinese took advantage of to construct bases on Korean islands along the northwest coast. The Manchu were uneasy with the Ming presence and sent an army into Korea in 1627. […]

Upon recommendation by the Westerners, King Injo reneged on the promises made during the alliance ritual and resumed relations with the Ming once the Manchu troops retreated. In the years after, the Chosŏn court recognized the military disadvantages of the 1627 attack and strengthened key defenses, such as the cavalry, arquebus soldiers, and archers.62 The government built up defenses along the frontier and moved troops to the west and northwest.63 Another consequence of the defensive buildup and pro-Ming stance was that, in time, Ming bases returned to Korean territory. All of these developments indicated to the Manchu that Chosŏn had not severed its ties to the Ming. […]

The incident with Ingguldai marked the end of Manchu attempts at negotiations. In early winter of 1637, roughly fifty thousand Manchu troops crossed the frozen Yalu River and attacked. Unlike in 1627, Korean commanders did not lead the assault. The top Manchu generals, Ingguldai and Mafuta, as well as Emperor Hung Taiji, directed the campaign, indicating the seriousness of Manchu resolve to settle the Korea issue permanently. Like the previous invasion, Manchu troops were unstoppable. The Manchu struck rapidly and within four days reached Seoul. […] »